At the stage of international post-Kyoto negotiations, the adoption of ambitious public policies raises an increasing interest, as society has a whole is more concerned by the scale of damages and the potential irreversibility linked to climate change. The introduction of a tradable permits market in Europe on January 1, 2005, in order to provide incentives to Member-States to take early abatement measures, may be seen as a decisive first step towards that direction.
Introduction
The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) has been created on January 1, 2005 to reduce by 8% CO 2 emissions in the European Union by 2012, relative to 1990 emissions levels. This aggregated emissions reduction target in the EU has been achieved following differentiated agreements, sharing efforts between Member States based on their potential of decarbonization of their economy. The introduction of a tradable permits market has been decided to help Member States in achieving their targets in the Kyoto Protocol, entered into force on February 2005 following the ratification of Iceland, and which aims at reducing the emissions of six greenhouse gases (GHG) considered as the main cause of climate change.
Among the Members of Annex B, these agreements include CO2 emissions reductions for 38 industrialized countries, with a global reduction of CO 2 emissions by 5.2% (see Table 2 ). These agreements have been fostered by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC (2000)) which recognizes three principles: the precautionary principle 1 , the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities 2 , and the principle of the right to in countries such as Brazil, China or India, the main issue of these negotiations is linked to achieving the largest possible level of cooperation, in order to avoid the well-known free riders behaviours, and to preserve the global public good that constitutes the climate. On this matter, the European Union has clearly adopted a leadership position, which contrasts with its early reluctance during the first steps of the negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol.
On January 2008, the European Commission has extended the scope of its action against global warming by 2020 with the "energy and climate change" package. This package aims at reducing GHG emissions by 20%, at increasing the use of renewable energy in energy consumption to 20%, and at saving 20% of energy by increasing energy efficiency. The
European carbon market, which has currently entered its Phase II (2008 -2012 , has been confirmed until 2020 also. Its scope has been extended to major sectors in terms of CO 2 emissions growth, such as aviation and petro-chemical industries during 2013-2020. These repeated public policies in favour of climate protection aim at correcting the negative externality attached to the release of uncontrolled GHG emissions in the atmosphere and thus, according to the well-known principle in economics, at internalizing the social cost of carbon. At the same time, these initiatives reveal the difficulty to create a scarcity condition regarding CO 2 emissions. These emissions indeed were not limited in the pre-existing institutional environment, and thus could not be considered as a scarce resource.
The European Union being at the forefront of environmental regulation dedicated to climate policies, this article reviews the market rules of the European carbon market during Phase I. It investigates the role played by the regulator, among the various choices at stake when creating a tradable permits market, on the behaviour of firms. Thus, this article contributes to the literature on the "birth" of the European carbon market (Convery et al. (2008 ), Convery (2009 ), Ellerman and Buchner (2008 ), by focusing our attention on the study of several key provisions in a moving institutional context, and by identifying learning effects.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the key design issues of the EU ETS. Section 3 examines the effects of banking restrictions between 2007 and 2008. Section 4 discusses the price fundamentals of CO 2 allowances. Section 5 details market participants' risk behaviour. Section 6 concludes.
Key Design Issues of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme
This section reviews the scope, allocation methodologies, calendar, transactions levels, and penalties associated to non-compliance on the EU ETS.
Scope
The Directive 2003/87/CE defines the scope of the EU ETS 6 . This scheme concerns around 10,600 installations in Europe, mainly in the production sectors of combustion, iron and steel, pulp and paper, refineries, and cement. Installations in these sectors are eligible to emissions trading when their energy consumption is superior to the threshold of 20MWTh. This threshold has been decided by the European Commission so as to target the most energyintensive industries during the first Phases of the program. This choice has been justified initially by the will of the European Commission to minimize political resistance, and to enforce a quick implementation of the scheme in 2005. To increase the environmental performance of the scheme, the debate is now centred on the progressive extension of its scope. The EU ETS Review 7 has revealed that other sectors will soon be included, such as aviation as of 2013.
Allocation
The CO 2 emissions reduction target of each Member State has been converted into National Allocation Plans (NAPs 
Transactions
One allowance exchanged on the EU ETS corresponds to one ton of CO2 released in the atmosphere, and is called a European Union Allowance (EUA). Allowance trading is recorded electronically by national registries. The information contained in these registries is centralized by the European Commission in the European registry, called the Community Independent Transaction Log (CITL) 9 . The CITL contains exhaustive information on CO 2 emissions for all installations covered by the EU ETS, and is used to account the compliance position of each firm. The information contained in the CITL is available at the installation level. As a first step, data compilation appears necessary to reconstruct the ownership structures between subsidiaries and parent companies, which yield to a more precise analysis for the evaluation of the scheme (McGuinness and Trotignon (2007)).
To comply with their emissions target, installations may exchange quotas either overthe-counter, or through brokers and market places. Bluenext, formerly Powernext Carbon, is the market place dedicated to CO 2 allowance trading based in Paris. The European Climate
Exchange is the market place based in London, which is leader for derivatives products.
NordPool represents the market place common to Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Norway, and is based in Oslo. The price of products exchanged on these market places are strongly correlated, which is conform to other market places like stock markets. Moreover, the European carbon market is characterised by an increasing sophistication of financial instruments using a quota of CO 2 as the underlying asset, and the development of option prices or swaps 10 . 10 Note there exists also financial instrument with a CDM credit on the secondary market as the underlying asset, stemming from the Kyoto Protocol and fungible with quotas traded in the EU ETS with a maximum limit of around 13.4%. Following this review of the institutional context on the European carbon market, we detail in the next section the allowance price development and associated banking strategies.
Banking Provisions
This section details the banking borrowing provisions adopted in the EU ETS.
Intertemporal emissions trading allows firms to smooth their emissions overtime, and offers a greater flexibility in order to meet the emissions target. Therefore, banking and borrowing allow firms to achieve their depolluting objectives at least cost, if these provisions are adequately configured by the regulators and their effects has been sufficiently discussed, evaluated and understood. Let us first examine the allowance price development in the EU ETS during 2005-
2007.

Price Developments Figure 4: EUA Spot and Futures Prices from July 2005 to May 2007
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In Figure 4 , we may observe that from January to July 2005, CO 2 prices increased due to the perceived scarcity of allowances: demand comes mainly from power producers, while most other market participants did not take advantage of buying/selling carbon allowances.
From 
Banking Restrictions
On the EU ETS, allowances are valid during a specific compliance year. However, an installation may have banked allowances during year N to cover its emissions during year N+1, 
CO 2 Price Fundamentals
This section focuses on the price fundamentals of CO 2 allowances. These fundamentals are mainly linked to regulatory decisions, energy prices and extreme temperatures events (Christiansen et al. (2005) ).
Institutional Decisions
First, it is worth noting that political and institutional decisions on the overall cap stringency have an impact on the carbon price setting through initial allocation. Also, any decision or announcement from regulators may induce changes in market players' behaviour.
From this perspective, official communications by the European Commission are essential to reach a better information flow on installations' net short/long positions 11 (Ellerman and Buchner (2008) 
Energy Prices
Second, energy prices are the most important price drivers on the short term of the EUA demand due to the ability of power generators to switch between their fuel inputs. This fuelswitching behaviour at the installations level applies especially in the power sector, which was endowed with more than 50% of EUAs during [2005] [2006] [2007] . The EU ETS price formation is indeed largely influenced by the electricity power market, since its participants are the main traders on the carbon market. (2) with ρ ngas the net thermal efficiency of a conventional gas-fired plant 16 , and EF ngas the CO 2 emissions factor of a conventional gas-fired power plant 17 .
During 2005-06, the use of coal appeared more profitable than gas. Since the beginning of 2007, the difference between the clean dark and clean spark spreads has been narrowing.
This situation encourages consequently electric companies to decrease the use of coal to the profit of natural gas. 
Extreme Weather Events
Weather conditions have an impact on EUA price changes by influencing energy demand. Previous literature focuses on the most important dimension of weather: extremely hot and cold degree-days (Roll (1984) ). Besides, we discuss the non-linearity of the relationship between temperatures and carbon price changes.
Weather influences may be captured by using the daily data of Powernext Weather indices (expressed in °C) for four countries: Spain, France, Germany and the United Kingdom.
These indices are computed as the temperature average at the representative regional weather station weighted by regional population: affected negatively carbon price changes. The economic rationale behind this analysis is that when extremely cold events are colder (hotter) than expected, power generators have to produce more (less) than they forecasted, which conducts to an increase (decrease) of allowances demand and finally to an increase (decrease) of CO 2 price changes.
In this section, we have identified as CO 2 price drivers energy prices, weather events, and institutional decisions during [2005] [2006] [2007] . Linked to the influence of political, energy, climatic and economic uncertainties on CO 2 price changes, we discuss in the next section adequate risk-hedging strategies on the EU ETS.
Risk-Hedging Strategies
This section deals with the risk-hedging strategies used by firms. Investors naturally attempt at hedging against a variation of the risk attached to allowance trading, especially given the institutional amendments to the functioning of the scheme. We discuss first the introduction of option prices in the EU ETS, and second the consequences on market participants' hedging strategies.
Carbon-based derivatives products
Investors need to manage the risk of holding CO 2 allowances on the European carbon market among a portfolio of diversified investments. As on financial markets, the uses of derivatives products allow to reduce the risk of a position on emissions markets. Indeed, the European Climate Exchange launched on October 2006 derivatives products trading carbon allowances as the underlying asset. 
Source: ECX
Since option prices transfer the risk of financial exposure between market agents, we further detail in the next section agents' behaviour with respect to risk on this newly created commodity derivatives market. Chevallier et al. (2009) 20 . They recover investors' risk aversion by using the existing relationship with the risk-neutral and historic probabilities. This methodology has proved to be robust for stock markets. First, the risk-neutral distribution is recovered from ECX option prices. Second, the historical distribution is approximated by the historical return distribution of futures allowance prices. Third, the risk aversion is obtained as a by-product (Leland (1980) ). Overall, this study provides an efficient tool to quantify the effects of risk aversion on the European carbon market which, during the period under consideration, has been higher than on the stock market. This situation underlines the necessity for investors to manage adequately the risk attached to holding CO 2 allowances. With the start of Phase II on a sound institutional framework, risk aversion on the European carbon market is likely to tend progressively towards the values found on stock markets.
Investors' risk aversion
Concluding Remarks
This article reviews the market rules of the European carbon market during 2005-2007.
The synthesis of theoretical and empirical approaches developed here has been fruitful for the analysis of banking, pricing and risk-hedging strategies. These results teach us that institutional learning has indeed occurred within Phase I, both from the viewpoint of market agents and the regulator.
The banking restrictions enforced between December 2007 and January 2008 in the EU ETS led to the disconnection between spot prices valid during Phase I, which plummeted to zero, and futures prices valid during Phase II, which remained stable around €20 throughout the period. This particular episode of the EU ETS highlights the necessity to understand the underlying mechanisms of CO 2 price changes.
Like other commodity markets, the amount of allowances available for trading and thus the EUA price are driven by the balance between supply and demand (energy prices, weather variables, etc.), and other factors related to market structure and institutional policies. Decision changes within the regulatory environment have a sharp market effect on allowance prices of all maturities. These structural breaks may be statistically identified within the time series of carbon prices, and are linked to yearly compliance events and to official communications by the European Commission. Besides, it is possible to isolate the influence of carbon price halshs-00458787, version 1 -22 Feb 2010 fundamentals linked to energy prices and extreme weather events, which varies before and after institutional events.
Carbon allowances therefore form another asset in commodities against which industrials and brokers need to hedge. Studies based on methods used on stock markets prove to be robust in quantifying changes in investors' anticipations.
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